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BOOK REVIEW
SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Jim Chen∗
From the ashes of global war, creative destruction forged the modern
world.1 From the heights of global capitalism, destructive creativity threatens
the postmodern world. The free flow of capital across national borders has
fueled wealth in all nations. The democratization of capital markets has
enabled a far larger portion of the world’s population to invest in the global
economy. At the same time, this expansion in the scale and scope of the
world’s financial system amplifies the risk at every level, from individual
investment portfolios to the very integrity of global capitalism.
A lifetime ago, the victors of the Second World War convened at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, to write new rules for international economic
engagement in the aftermath of global cataclysm. Mindful that hyperinflation
and economic collapse had sparked the rise of national socialism and other
tyrannical ideologies, the international community adopted three formal
agreements that gave rise to the bedrock organizations of modern international
economic law: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”)),2 the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”),3
and the World Bank.4
These formal institutions of international economic law offered at most a
modest response to the financial crisis of 2008, the deepest challenge to global
markets since the Great Depression. A far more decentralized, fragmented set
of institutions devised ad hoc rules for restoring order to a financial sector
whose mismanagement of risk in radically democratized and destabilized
∗ Dean and Professor of Law, University of Louisville. Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen.
I also appreciate help from Robert B. Ahdieh, Christopher French, Gil Grantmore, and Jeffrey Sexton.
1 See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (Harper &
Bros. Publishers 3d ed. 1950) (discussing the process of creative destruction).
2 The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
3 History, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2011).
4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD): Background, WORLD BANK,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/0,,contentMDK:21130269~men
uPK:3168298~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3046012,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
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markets had brought the entire world economy to the brink of collapse. In stark
contrast with the traditional preference for international lawmaking through
treaties and formal coordination among sovereign nation-states,5 the
international legal system attempted to stabilize the global financial system
through a complex web of multinational agencies, standard-setting
organizations, and the rules devised by those decision-makers. During the
defining economic disaster of postmodern times, soft law served as first
responder.
In Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule-Making in the TwentyFirst Century,6 Christopher J. Brummer provides a detailed and informative
analysis of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis of
2008. This accomplishment alone warrants a close look at this book. Yet,
Professor Brummer goes further in this pivotal work on the law of international
finance. He provides a persuasive, theoretical account of international financial
law. Soft Law and the Global Financial System not only describes the
mechanisms of lawmaking and standard-setting for global financial markets,
but also delivers a workable framework for prescribing and perhaps even
perfecting the regulation of the world’s most vital and volatile economic
institutions.
Chapter 1 of Soft Law and the Global Financial System examines the
related phenomena of territoriality and regulatory export in international
financial law.7 The national law of dominant markets, supplemented by the
customary practices of those countries’ most influential financial actors, has
historically supplied many of the rules in international finance.8 By virtue of its
preeminence in global capital markets, the United States as global hegemon
has long dictated the terms by which bankers, broker-dealers, and other
financial intermediaries have moved wealth around the world.9 The global
crisis of 2008 severely undermined the American claim to economic wisdom
and political legitimacy. Investors and regulators around the world freely
assigned ample blame to “American-style free-market capitalism and the idea

5 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Skeptical Internationalism: A Study of Whether International Law Is Law, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2506–13 (2010).
6 CHRISTOPHER J. BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE-MAKING IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (forthcoming Jan. 2012).
7 See generally id. (manuscript at 19–50).
8 See id. (manuscript at 30–35).
9 Id. (manuscript at 24, 29, 36–38, 45).
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of globalization.”10 Countries that had emulated the American approach to
financial regulation by “open[ing] themselves to trade and foreign investment
took an especially tough hit.”11 Meanwhile, countries that were “less
dependent on cross-border financial flows,” whether by design or by default,
“weathered the storm.”12
The global economy reflects the continuing decentralization of
international financial law. The ongoing crisis of confidence in sovereign debt
and the European banking industry exposes the European Union’s vulnerability
to the sort of economic miscalculations that humbled Lehman Brothers and the
entire American financial sector in 2008.13 Meanwhile, the “BRIC” nations—
Brazil, Russia, India, and China—continue their economic and political
ascendancy.14 The emerging system of international financial law exhibits
distinct multipolarity without inescapable polarization.15 Hegemons old and
new, from the United States and the European Union to BRIC and lesser blocs,
continue to control financial rules within their borders.16 Even more important,
the highly decentralized, informal, and market-driven nature of international
finance enables national regulators to export their rules and norms to receptive
markets around the world.17 As a result, the makers of international financial
law routinely share information, engage counterparts, and exhibit a healthy
inclination to forge policy through compromise rather than conflict.18
In Chapter 2, Soft Law and the Global Financial System describes the
architecture of international financial law.19 Professor Brummer details the rise
of the institutions that promulgate rules, set standards, and enforce compliance
in international financial law.20 In stark contrast with the WTO, IMF, and
10 IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND
CORPORATIONS? 178 (2010).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 See Editorial, Curing Europe’s Banking Ills, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2011, 11:15 PM), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/f659abb6-edb9-11e0-a9a9-00144feab49a.html; Robert Reich, Editorial, Follow the Money:
Behind Europe’s Debt Crisis Lurks Another Wall Street Bailout, PBS (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/
need-to-know/opinion/follow-the-money-behind-europes-debt-crisis-lurks-another-wall-street-bailout.
14 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14); Peter Apps, A Decade on, Rise of BRICs Shaped by
September 11, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 2011, available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idAFJOE7890CN20110910.
15 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 46).
16 Id. (manuscript at 14).
17 Id.
18 Id. (manuscript at 14, 46).
19 Id. (manuscript at 51–95).
20 Id.
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World Bank (the troika of international economic organizations tracing their
origins to Bretton Woods), the agencies of international financial law lack the
attributes of formal international organizations—institutions created by formal,
ratified treaties and validated by “state membership, tangible manifestations of
organizational bureaucracy, and an adequate legal pedigree.”21 The principal
creators of international financial law fall into four distinct categories: agendasetters, sectoral standard-setters, specialists, and international monitors.22 The
financial ministers and the central bankers of the Group of Twenty Finance
Ministers and Central Bank Governors (“G-20”) work alongside the newer and
more technocratic Financial Stability Board in setting the agenda for global
financial regulation.23 The task of setting international standards for the
regulation of the banking, securities, and insurance industries falls to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization for
Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”), and the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (“IAIS”).24 The Basel Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS in
turn coordinate their efforts within the Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates.25 A wide variety of specialized standards emerges from
organizations such as the International Accounting Standards Board, the
International Federation of Accountants, the Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems, the Financial Action Task Force, the International
Association of Deposit Insurers, and the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association.26 Several “hard law” organizations advance these efforts in a
supporting or monitoring capacity.27 The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development has devised standards for corporate
governance.28 The Bank for International Settlements not only supplies
research support to international financial standard-setting organizations, but
also participates as a private, for-profit provider of reserve management
services to central banks and other monetary authorities.29 Finally, the IMF and
the World Bank monitor other regulators’ formal compliance with international
financial law.30 Together, these heterogeneous entities form a fragmented
21 David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 305 (1998).
22 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 58–78).
23 Id. (manuscript at 60).
24 Id. (manuscript at 61, 63–64).
25 Id.
26 Id. (manuscript at 58–72).
27 Id. (manuscript at 73).
28 Id. (manuscript at 70–71).
29 Id. (manuscript at 73).
30 Id.
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network of structurally independent actors with distinctive sources of authority
and pathways for legal decision-making.31
The functional paradox of international financial law lies in the relationship
between elements of formal, “hard” law and the gradual development and
enforcement of “soft” law. At an admittedly high level of abstraction, agencies
of international financial law observe hard law rules as a matter of internal
operation, but cooperate with each other and with private market actors in an
informal social network disciplined principally through soft law norms.32 From
a thorough examination of this phenomenon, Chapter 3 of Soft Law and the
Global Financial System develops a compliance-based theory of international
financial law.33 By and large, best practices in contemporary global finance
have not emerged through positive, prescriptive lawmaking within a single,
hegemonic nation-state and the de facto export of that nation’s regulatory
standards to the rest of the world.34 International financial standards are even
less likely to be developed through a rigid process of formal lawmaking within
a treaty-based international organization.35 Instead, the decentralized network
of global financial actors with diverse, broadly distributed responsibilities
engages in cycles of reciprocity and retaliation as a cooperative method of
developing international financial law.36 Over the long run, uncooperative,
self-interested regulators can expect to lose the assistance of other actors
within the international financial system.37 Countries that fail to follow an
international regulatory consensus, such as a tightening of risk-based capital
requirements for banks, jeopardize their financial sector’s access to foreign
markets.38 Not surprisingly, the enforcement mechanisms of international
financial law closely resemble the reputational tools that financiers, traders,
and other private actors routinely use to patrol self-dealing and enforce socially

31 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36–64 (2004) (describing international regulation
as a series of “transgovernmental networks” consisting of executive officials and international organizations).
32 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 55–56).
33 Id. (manuscript at 96–141).
34 Id. (manuscript at 36).
35 Id. (manuscript at 15–16).
36 See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 42–48
(2008).
37 See generally id. at 71–117 (discussing the theory of a nation’s reputation).
38 See, e.g., DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING STANDARDS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 60 (2007) (describing how American and British regulators successfully
persuaded Japan to accept more stringent risk-based capital requirements for banks by making a credible threat
to exclude Japanese banks from American and British markets).
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beneficial norms within their own communities.39 The thin shell of hard
formality in international financial law adds the threat of institutional
sanctions, such as the denial or withdrawal of membership in an international
organization, to this arsenal.
International financial law thus combines legal pronouncements and
market-based enforcement decisions among financial regulators interacting in
a global and mostly informal network. The uncomfortable truth is that the
nodes in this regulatory network are far from equal.40 Chapter 4 of Soft Law
and the Global Financial System focuses on the arguable crisis of legitimacy
created by this inequality.41 International financial law demands that its
enforcers accomplish the formidable political feat of demanding compliance
within global financial markets while sidestepping democratic accountability
within domestic and international legal institutions.42 At least within the
academic imagination, the technocratic nature of formal lawmaking confers an
advantage in accountability and authoritativeness on “hard” international law.43
The crafting of formal international law through “justification and persuasion
in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts” enforces a sort of evidencebased discipline on national law and politics.44 Governments that flout
international law “without a defensible position or without reasonable efforts
to justify their conduct in legal terms” will “incur reputation costs” for their
treachery.45
But those are the very terms by which soft law operates. Professor
Brummer demonstrates that the conventional dichotomy between hard and soft
law operates more as a sieve.46 The self-interest of private actors, nation-states,
and international regulators in reputational goodwill prevails at all points along
the spectrum between hard and soft law.47 The real source of soft international
law’s democratic deficit lies in the “dynamic incorporation” of financial
39 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 123–36 (1991)
(discussing theoretical aspects of social control); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (discussing the enforcement
mechanisms in the diamond industry).
40 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 142).
41 Id. (manuscript at 142–65).
42 Id. (manuscript at 145, 153).
43 Id. (manuscript at 50); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 429 (2000).
44 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 43, at 429.
45 Id.
46 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 136–37).
47 See id. (manuscript at 101–02).
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standards adopted by foreign decision-makers into domestic law, with little or
no opportunity for domestic politicians or regulators to participate at the
international level.48 Dynamic incorporation without domestic deliberation is
in practice the norm for the economically weakest players in global financial
markets, for these are the countries and nongovernmental constituencies least
likely to participate within the informal, decentralized regulatory framework
for making international financial law.49 The United States and the European
Union may have lost some of their economic power over global financial
markets, but Wall Street, London’s “City,” and the bourses of the Continent
remain in practice, if not in law, the primary pacesetters for global financial
traffic.50
These fears permeate contemporary commentary on international law, and
they are by no means confined to the financial context.51 In pragmatic if not
philosophical terms, this purported democratic deficit pales in significance
alongside the substantive performance of international law in containing global
financial crises. To answer this question, Soft Law and the Global Financial
System turns, in Chapter 5, to a close examination of the international financial
crisis of 2008.52
“Creativity and risk are inexorably linked.”53 What is true of industrial
design is likewise true of finance. The global financial crisis of 2008 traces its
origins to a single country, the United States, and to the unintended
consequences of mindless mantras embodied in a slogan so closely aligned
with national character that it was called “the American dream.”54
Homeownership, as every American schoolchild should now know, does not
guarantee financial stability. Nor do home values consistently rise. But the
imprudent extension of subprime mortgages and the aggressive marketing of
ever more complex and exotic instruments, from mortgage-backed securities to
collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps, within a globally

48

See Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 115 (2008).
See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 158).
50 See, e.g., Mark Scott, The World’s Top Financial Centers, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 5, 2008,
12:42 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/mar2008/gb2008035_012894.htm.
51 See, e.g., Anthony Payne, How Many Gs Are There in ‘Global Governance’ After the Crisis?: The
Perspectives of the ‘Marginal Majority’ of the World’s States, 86 INT’L AFF. 729, 734–37 (2010) (discussing
the global governance of trade).
52 BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169).
53 Robert N. Jerrard et al., Design, Risk and New Product Development in Five Small Creative
Companies, INT’L J. DESIGN, Apr. 2008, at 21, 21.
54 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169).
49
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interconnected financial industry converted the miscalculation of risk within
one country into a worldwide liquidity crisis.55 The U.S. Senate, with full
hindsight, recognized that “the crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of
high risk, complex financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the
failure of regulators, the credit rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in
the excesses of Wall Street.”56 The free flow of capital across national borders
thus transmogrified an almost absurdly American problem of overconfidence
in real estate markets into an economic calamity of global proportions.
The resulting crisis has drawn a comparably aggressive and creative cycle
of regulatory responses from national governments and international agencies.
Chapter 5 of Soft Law and the Global Financial System documents some of the
most significant legal reactions on the global stage.57 In its effort to repair the
American credit crisis’ damage to financial institutions around the world,
international financial law has sought to achieve goals as elusive as they are
lofty: smooth coordination across national borders, full implementation of
standards developed through international consensus, and consistently correct,
risk-reducing regulatory policy.58 At every turn, American and European
regulators—legal actors in the jurisdictions most deeply affected by the global
financial crisis—have clashed over the measures that the global financial
system should adopt.59 The Third Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, better known as Basel III, embodies a hard-fought but arguably
impotent compromise over risk-weighting and capital requirements for
banks.60 “Shadow banking” by nontraditional institutions such as hedge funds
has confounded efforts to identify systemically important financial institutions
and to combat the moral hazard inherent in an industry dominated by
participants that are “too big to fail.”61 Overt national disagreements have
blocked smooth cooperation over issues that are at once technocratic and
culturally polarizing.62 The International Accounting Standards Board,
practically speaking, must reconcile the American preference for fair value
accounting with the contrasting European affinity for historical accounting

55

See id. (manuscript at 169–70).
STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET
FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 1 (Comm. Print 2011).
57 See BRUMMER, supra note 6 (manuscript at 169).
58 See id. (manuscript at 187, 191).
59 See id. (manuscript at 202–03).
60 Id. (manuscript at 187–88, 195).
61 Id. (manuscript at 177–79).
62 Id. (manuscript at 180–81).
56

AND THE
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coupled with amortization. Limitless executive compensation and naked credit
default swaps are anathema to Europeans, particularly the French.63 Those very
features define the cultural landscape of American finance.64
Cognizant of these barriers to effective international cooperation, Soft Law
and the Global Financial System concludes with a cautiously hopeful note on
the future of international financial law. In Chapter 6, Professor Brummer
rebuffs calls for the creation of a World Finance Organization.65 The sheer
complexity and scope of cross-border financial transactions, to say nothing of
the primary actors’ devilish creativity, thwarts the dream of a solution that
parallels the Bretton Woods institutions and their management of world trade
and international monetary policy. Instead, international financial law will
probably proceed on some variation of the existing mechanism for developing
best regulatory practices through financial diplomacy. The considerable gaps
left by this international system will provide ample opportunity for
intervention by national regulators.
The arc of modern international law, from the Treaty of Westphalia to the
United Nations Charter and the Bretton Woods trilogy of economic accords, is
seductive, symmetrical, and beautiful. International law’s attraction to
formality, elegant and austere, mirrors the financial world’s love affair with the
Gaussian mathematics that dominates contemporary business and scientific
cultures.66 In Soft Law and the Global Financial System, Christopher Brummer
subjects this comforting mirage to the withering realism of adaptive
lawmaking for global financial markets. In those unruly markets, the only thing
that rises is correlation.67 The law’s efforts to coordinate markets,
paradoxically and perversely, amplify financial risks and deepen the scale of
losses when they accrue.68 The lawyerly preference for ordered liberty quickly
gives way to the pragmatic acceptance of international financial law as a
constantly evolving body of regulatory norms that achieve neither economic
nor democratic completeness. The hope that countries might cooperate
formally to minimize the risk of another global financial collapse belongs to “a
63
64
65
66

Id. (manuscript at 202).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 218–19).
See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 277–78

(2007).
67 See, e.g., The New Role of Risk Management: Rebuilding the Model, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (June
24, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2268 (“The only thing that rises in falling
markets is correlations.”).
68 See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326–27 (2011).
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system of childish illusions that dominates”69 international law. At the very
point where “this fact . . . is grasped,” this elementary view of international law
“like first love . . . passes into memory.”70 In financial affairs, no less than in
other dimensions of international relations, salvation often lies in nothing more
tangible than soft power.71 As squalls on the economic horizon signal the next
global financial collapse, this system of soft international law, at once
imperfect and unpredictable, promises what may be the worthiest lifeboat in
the storm.

69 DAVID BERLINSKI, A TOUR OF THE CALCULUS 239 (1995) (discussing the “hope that antidifferentiation
might return an elementary function to an elementary function,” a known impossibility in elementary
mathematics).
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at xii (2004)
(“[S]oft power is essential to winning the peace.”); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Comment, The Decline of America’s
Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2004, at 16, 16.

